Kitab al-Usul al-Khamsa
(Book of the Five Fundamentals)
A Translation.
By the Learned Juris consult 'Abd al-Jabbar, may God's blessing and favour be upon him.
In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent and the Most Merciful.
[I. First Principles]
[A. Knowledge of God]
1. If it is asked: What is the first duty that God imposes upon you? Say to him: Speculative reasoning (al-nazar) which leads to knowledge of God, because He is not known intuitively (daruratan) nor by the senses (bi l-mushahada). Thus, He must be known by reflection and speculation.
2. Then if it is asked: Why do you say that is obligatory? Say to him: Because we fear that if we do not come to know Him we will disobey Him and thus we will perish. Therefore, it is obligatory for us to know Him in order to avoid disobedience and to perform obedient acts.
3. Then if it is asked: Why did speculative reasoning become the first of the duties? Say to him: Because the rest of the stipulates of revelation (shara'i, pl. of shari'a) concerning what [we should] say and do are no good until after there is knowledge of God. Do you not see that it is no good for us to pray without knowing to whom we are to pray?
4. Then if it is asked: What is the first grace bestowed upon you by God? Say to him: That is something that I cannot account for. In general, however, He created me a living [being], and provided me with power (al-qudra) and physical means (al-ala). And He perfected my nature (khulq) and gave me passions and enabled me to enjoy a variety of pleasurable things. Then, He issued me commands and prohibitions so that I could attain the [requisite] level of reward and enter the Heavens. Therefore, it is incumbent on me to establish His existence and to know Him so that I can worship Him, give Him thanks and do what satisfies Him and avoid disobedience toward Him.
5. Then if it is asked: If reasoning speculatively on the knowledge of God is incumbent then on what do you speculate? Say to him: On evidentiary proofs (al-adilla).
6. Then if it is asked: What are the proofs? Say to him: There are four: rational argument (hujat al-'aql), scripture (al-kitab), the example [of the Prophet] (Sunna), and the consensus [of the community] (ijma'). Knowledge of God can only be gained by speculating with rational argument, because if we do not [first] know that He is truthful we will not know the authenticity of the Book, the Sunna and the communal consensus.
7. Then if it is asked: What is the proof by which speculative reason leads to the knowledge of God? Say to him: My own being (or "self" nafsi) and what I observe about [physical] bodies.
8. Then if it is asked: How can your own being be evidence of God? Say to him: Because I find my own being in a state of perfection, and it is impossible for me to create something like myself or some parts of myself. Thus, a fortiori, as I am unable in my original state of being a drop of sperm to create myself, I know that I have a creator and designer who is good, and who is other than me, and He is God.
9. Then if it is asked: How does this give proof of God? Say to him: Because I know that bodies must have motion, rest, contiguity and separation, and these things are contingent (muhdatha). Thus, bodies (al-jism) must be contingent since transitory things (al-hawadith) are not eternal.
[B. The Fundamentals of Religion]
10. Then if it is said: Tell me all that is necessary for one to know about the fundamentals of religion (usul al-din). Say to him: There are five fundamentals of religion: unicity (tawhid); justice ('adl); the promise and the threat (al-wa'd wa l-wa'id); the intermediate position (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn); and commanding the good and prohibiting evil (al-amr bi l-ma'ruf wa l-nahy 'an l-munkar). These are the fundamentals on which religion is based. Anyone who opposes them is in great error and may commit unbelief or grave sin because of that. But if you know these fundamentals, it follows that you will have to know about jurisprudence (fiqh) and divine legislation (shar'iyat).
11. Then if it is asked: What is [God's] unicity? Say to him: It is the knowledge that God, being unique, has attributes that no creature shares with Him. This is explained by the fact that you know that the world has a creator (sani') who created it and that: [a] He existed eternally in the past and He cannot perish while we exist after being non-existent, and we can perish. [b] And you know that He was and is eternally all-powerful (qadir) and that impotence (al-'ajz) is not possible for Him. [c] And you know that He is omniscient of the past and present and that ignorance (jahl) is not possible for Him. [d] And you know that He knows everything that was, everything that is, and how things that are not would be if they were. [e] And you know that He is eternally in the past and future living, and that calamities and pain are not possible for Him. [f] And you know that He sees visible things (mar'iyat), and perceives perceptibles, and that He does not have need of sense organs. [g] And you know that He is eternally past and in future sufficient (ghani) and it is not possible for Him to be in need. [h] And you know that He is not like [physical] bodies, and that it is not possible for Him to get up or down, move about, change, be composite, have a form [...] limbs and body members. [i] And you know that He is not like the accidents of motion, rest, color, food or smells. [j] And you know that He is One throughout eternity and there is no second beside Him, and that everything other than He is contingent, made, dependent (muhtaj), structured (mudabbar), and governed [by someone/thing else]. Thus, if you know all of that you know [God's] unicity.
12. Then if it is said: Tell me about [divine] justice (al-'adl); what is it? Say to him: It is the knowledge that God is removed from all that is morally wrong (qabih) and that all His acts are morally good (hasana). This is explained by the fact that you know that all human acts of injustice (zulm), transgression (jawr), and the like cannot be of His creation (min khalqihi). Whoever attributes that to Him has ascribed to Him injustice and insolence (safah) and thus strays from the doctrine of justice. [a] And you know that God does not impose faith upon the unbeliever without giving him the power (al-qudra) for it, nor does He impose upon a human what he is unable to do, but He only gives to the unbeliever to choose unbelief on his own part, not on the part of God. [b] And you know that God does not will, desire or want disobedience. Rather, He loathes and despises it and only wills obedience, which He wants and chooses and loves. [c] And you know that He does not punish the children of polytheists (al-mushrikin) in Hellfire because of their fathers' sin, for He has said: "Each soul earns but its own due" (Q. 6:164); and He does not punish anyone for someone else's sin because that would be morally wrong (qabih), [and] God is far removed from such. [d] And you know that He does not transgress His rule (hukm) and [...] that He only causes sickness and illness in order to turn them to advantage. Whoever says otherwise has allowed that God is iniquitous and has imputed insolence to Him. [e] And you know that, for their sakes, He does the best for all of His creatures, upon whom He imposes [moral and religious] obligations (yukallifuhum), and that He has indicated to them what He has imposed upon them and clarified the path of truth so that we could pursue it, and He has clarified the path of falsehood (tariq l-batil) so that we could avoid it. So, whoever perishes does so only after [all this has been made] clear. [f] And you know that every benefit we have is from God; as He has said: "And you have no good thing that is not from Allah" (Q. 16:53); it either comes to us from Him or from elsewhere. [g] Thus, when you know all of this you become knowledgeable about [God's] justice.
13. Then if it is said: Tell me about the promise and the threat; what are they? Say to him: They are the knowledge that God promises recompense (al-thawab) to those who obey Him and He threatens punishment to those who disobey Him. He will not go back on His word, nor can He act contrary to His promise and threat nor lie in what He reports, in contrast to what the Postponers (al-Murji'a) hold.
14. Then if it is said: Tell me about the intermediate position (al-manzila bayn l-manzilatayn); what is it? Say to him: It is the knowledge that whoever murders, or fornicates (zana), or commits serious sins is a grave sinner (fasiq) and not a believer, nor is his case the same that of believers with respect to praise and attributing greatness, since he is [to be] cursed and disregarded. Nonetheless, he is not an unbeliever who can't be buried in our [Muslim] cemetery, or be prayed for, or marry [a Muslim]. Rather, he has an intermediate position, in contrast to the Seceders (Khawarij) who say that he is an unbeliever, or the Murji'a who say that he is a believer.
15. Then if it is said: Tell me about commanding the good and prohibiting evil (al-amr bi l-ma'ruf wa l-nahy 'an l-munkar); what are they? Say to him: Commanding the good is of two types. One of them is obligatory, which is commanding religious duties (al-fara'id) when someone neglects them (dayya'aha), and the other is supererogatory (al-nafila), which is commanding supererogatory [acts of devotion] when someone omits to do them (tarakaha). As for prohibiting evil, all of it is obligatory because all evil is ethically wrong (qabih). It is necessary, if possible, to reach a point where evil (al-munkar) does not occur in the easiest of circumstances or lead to something worse, for the goal is for evil simply not to happen.
'Abd al-Jabbar and Classical Mu'tazilism
And, if it is possible to reach the point where good (al-ma'ruf) occurs in the easiest of circumstances, then preferring the difficult [circumstances] would be impermissible. Similarly, God has said: "If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight against the one who transgresses until he complies with the command of Allah; [then, if he complies, make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who act fairly]" (Q.). Thus, prohibiting evil is obligatory only if the view does not prevail that [prohibiting a particular evil] would lead to an increase in disobedience, and if a preference for what was harmful were [not] predominant. If such a view does prevail, [prohibiting evil] would not be obligatory, and avoiding it would be more appropriate.
[II. Divine Unicity]
[A. Inferring God's Existence from Physical Bodies]
16. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that you yourself and all bodies are contingent (muhdath)? Say to him: Because they always have motion, rest, separateness, and contiguity [relative to one another], and all of these are necessarily transitory, so [bodies] must similarly be contingent.
17. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that bodies are produced? Say to him: Because writing, constructing and craft (sina'a) [are activities that] require a maker, from whence [it follows that] they are contingent (muhdath), so it is necessary for them to have a producer (muhdith), for every thing contingent must have a producer and maker.
[B. Inferring God's Attributes]
18. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He has the power [to act] (annahu qadir)? Say to him: Because an act in the visible world (al-shahid) can only be [the act of] one who has the power [to act autonomously] (min qadir), and acting is valid on God's part, so it must be said that He is qadir [has the power to act].
19. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that God is omniscient ('alim)? Say to him: Because skillful acts (al-af'al al-muhkama) such as writing and crafts (al-sina'at) can only be done by one who knows [how]. And since it is true for God, in creating human beings, to exceed the wonders of crafts, therefore, He must be omniscient.
20. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is living (hayy)? Say to him: Indeed, everyone who is powerful and knowing must be living.
21. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is hearing (sami'), seeing (basir), and perceiving of perceptibles (mudrik li l-mudrakat)? Say to him: Because He is a living being with no deficiencies, and deficiencies are impossible for Him, and each one who has these attributes must be hearing, seeing, and perceiving of perceptibles, the same as we grasp things with our intellects in the visible world (kama na'qiluh fi l-shahid).
22. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is existent (annahu mawjud)? Say to him: Because He is omnipotent, and it would not be possible for a nonexistent being (ma'dum) to act, because His being nonexistent could not be related to a possible nonexistent [entity] (bi l-maqdur). Therefore He must be existent. If not, it would open the way to much ignorance.
23. Then if it is asked: What is proof that He is eternal (qadim)? Say to him: Because if He were contingent (muhdath) He would need someone to cause Him to exist, and that would lead to a regressus ad infinitum (ila ma la nihaya lahu). Therefore He must be eternal.
24. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is self-sufficient (ghani) and that it is impossible for Him to be in need? Say to him: Because one for whom pleasure, benefit and desire are possible must be [in] a physical body for which increase and decrease are possible. God is not a body. Therefore He must be self-sufficient.
25. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is not a [physical] body (jism)? Say to him: Because if He were a body then [a] He would have to be contingent, because bodies are existent things, and then [b] it would not be appropriate for Him to make bodies, the same as it is not possible for us to make bodies.
26. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that God is unseen (la yura)? Say to him: Because God has said: "vision (al-absar) does not perceive Him" (Q. 6:103), and the perception involved in vision is seeing (al-ru'ya), so He is necessarily unseen unless He is [present] in one mode but not in another, and Allah is [removed] from that, because that is the mark of being contingent (huduth). Therefore, He must be unseen by the sense of vision, but only seen by the heart, insight (ma'rifa) and knowledge ('ilm). There is His saying: "That day will faces be resplendent, looking towards their Lord" (Q. 75:22–23); its interpretation is that [those faces] are waiting for God's recompense, or waiting for His mercy, according to what the Qur'an interpreters have related, so that it accords with the evidence of reason and the Book.
27. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that He is One and has no second? Say to him: If there were besides Him a second who was eternal then [the second] would have to be like Him in eternity, but the Eternal One is eternal in Himself (li-nafsihi). Thus, He must be omnipotent in and of Himself. If there were two beings who were omnipotent in themselves it would be possible for one of them to cause a body to move and the other to cause it to remain at rest. If that were the case it would have to be so in one of three ways: Either [a] the two things they willed must both exist, which is impossible because they contradict each other. [b] Or neither of them exists, which is impossible because it implies the impotence of both, and it is impossible for the omnipotent divine being to be impotent. So [c] it must be that one of the two willed things exists, and that necessitates that one be powerful and the other be impotent, and the impotent one cannot be eternal or divine. And it establishes that He is One. On this He has said: "If there were in them a divinity besides Allah, there would have been confusion in both [the Heaven and the Earth]" (Q.). On this basis the doctrine of the Dualists (al-Thanawiya) that The [God of] Light and The [God of] Darkness are both eternal is refuted. And that by which we have proved that bodies are contingent and have a creator also refutes their doctrine. And on this basis the doctrine of Christians that in God are three hypostases (aqanim): the father, the son and holy spirit, is refuted, for we have explained that He is One, and because it is absurd for that which is one in reality [also] to be three in reality.
[III. Theodicy]
28. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that God does not do that which is ethically wrong (la yaf'alu al-qabih)? Say to him: Because He knows the immorality of all unethical acts (pl. qaba'ih) and that He is self-sufficient without them, and it is impossible for Him to do them. For one of us who knows the immorality of injustice and lying, if he knows that he is self-sufficient without them and has no need of them, it would be impossible for him to choose them, in so far as he knows of their immorality and his sufficiency without them. Therefore, if God is sufficient without need of any unethical thing it necessarily follows that He would not choose the unethical, based on His knowledge of its immorality. Thus every immoral thing that happens in the world must be a human act, for God transcends doing [immoral acts]. Indeed, God has distanced Himself from that with His saying: "But Allah wills no injustice to His servants" (Q. 40:31), and His saying: "Verily Allah will not deal unjustly with humankind in anything" (Q. 10:44). And even if we allowed that He did what was unethical, we would not believe that He punished the prophets and the righteous ones (al-salihin) and sent them to the Hellfire (al-nar), and we would not believe that His word was a lie and an order that could be nullified, for that, then, would necessitate that we [could] not trust in His promise and threat. And we do not believe that He sends prophets to the Hellfire and enemies and unbelievers to Paradise. Anyone who did such things would not command our obedience to Him because we could not be safe from His evil, and by obeying Him we would create the utmost havoc. And it would necessitate the possibility that God could send to humankind one who called them to unbelief and deception, and manifest through him miracles and proofs. For if it were possible for Him to do what is unethical, what would prohibit Him from doing all of [what we have just mentioned]? And saying this would lead us not to trust in the Book and the Sunna, and not to know the Shar'ia. And it would lead us to be unsure [whether] what we do is straying (dalal) [from the Right Path] and what unbelievers do is truth. Whoever reaches this point, his error (khata'uhu) is detestable and his infamy is great.
29. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that human acts are not created (laysat bi-makhluqat) by God but that they are done with His knowledge? Say to him: If they were done by God then what good would there be in His commanding those that are ethically good and prohibiting those that are ethically bad, and praising and rewarding obedience but blaming and punishing disobedience? In the same way, it would not be good for Him to command His acts in us, such as color, shape, health, and sickness, or to prohibit such, or lay blame for such. Moreover, if God were the agent of our acts then they would not have happened according to our purposes and motivations. And moreover, [even] a wise man cannot create his own abuse, or condemn and vilify [himself]; for how could it be said that every abuse and vilification [addressed] to him is of his own doing? And moreover, whoever commits injustice and transgression must be unjust and a transgressor. Thus, if God committed injustice He would be unjust, just as if He acted justly He would be just, and whoever says [otherwise] is an unbeliever. He has said: "You will see no disharmony in the creation of [God] the Beneficent" (Q. 67:3), and: "He who has made everything that He has created good" (Q. 32:7), and: "[Such is] the artistry of Allah, who disposes of all things in perfect order" (Q. 27:88). These verses indicate that these ethically bad acts are not created by God but that they are human acts, and on that basis they deserve blame and punishment. How can it be possible for God to create erroneous behavior in them and then punish them, thus saying: "Why do you disbelieve?" Isn't that the same as someone commanding his slave to do something, then punishing him for it? And that would clearly be corrupt.
30. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that the power [to act autonomously] (qudra) precedes the act [itself]? Say to him: Because if it were simultaneous with the act then necessarily the unbeliever would not have had the capacity [power] (qudra) to have faith. And if he did not have the power for it, it would not be good for God to command it because God does not impose on human beings what they do not have the power to do, according to His saying: "On no one does Allah place a burden greater than he can bear" (Q. 2:286); and "Allah puts no burden on anyone unless He has enabled him and given to him [what he needs in order to bear it]" (Q. 65:7). If it were possible for Him to impose on [His] servants what they were unable to do then it would be possible for Him to enjoin (yukallif) the impotent to act, the disabled to run, and the blind to place the diacritical points correctly in the text of the Qur'an; and to enjoin us to climb to the roof without using stairs; all of that is clearly spurious. This establishes the fact [a] that He only enjoins on His servants what they have the power to do, and [b] that the unbeliever has the power [both] to believe and to disbelieve, so if it comes from him to disbelieve, it is by his choice. [This is] the same as if we gave a man a knife to use to his own advantage but he killed himself with it. The one who gave him the knife did him a good deed, but he harmed himself using the knife for what caused the danger, and not for what benefited himself. Likewise, God gives the unbeliever power (qudra), but [the latter] uses it to destroy himself and does not use it [to adopt] faith; thus it is he who destroys and does evil to himself. That which indicates that [God] does not impose upon humankind what they do not have the power to do is that it is impossible to command someone with no wealth to pay religious charity (zakat), because the zakat is invalid without property. Similarly, He does not command His servant to believe if he does not have the power for it, because faith is invalid without the power for it. And that which indicates that the power precedes the act is that the instrument, such as the hand or foot, by which the act occurs must exist prior to it. So, too, the power [must exist prior to the act].
31. Then if it is asked: What is the proof that God does not will disobedience, and why do you deny that everything that happens in the world is by the will and wish of God? Say to him: Because we say that every religious duty ('ibadat) is an act that He wills and wants and consents to, and every form of disobedience He prohibits is an act that He loathes and censures and for which He threatens punishment. The proof of that is that it would be impossible for a wise man to command something he loathed and to prohibit something he wanted. God has commanded [us to have] faith, so He must will it; and He prohibits unbelief, so He must loathe it. [God] has said: "And God wills no injustice for his servants" (Q. 40:31); and "I created the jinn and humankind only to worship [Me]" (Q. 51:56). And He said after He mentioned a number of disobedient acts: "All of that is evil, loathsome in [the sight of] your Lord" (Q. 17:38). That which indicates this is that a wise man would not will to do something ethically wrong, because willing something ethically wrong is ethically wrong, and wanting to do something insolent is insolence, just as willing wisdom is wisdom. Thus, if God is all-wise we know that He does not will insolence. How would it be possible [for Him] to will to curse and condemn Himself, and how could it be said that every corruption or injustice that occurred to humankind was willed by Him?
32. Then if it is said: If something that [God] did not will happened in the world, that would necessitate His impotence. Say to him: Are there not [cases] in the world where He does not command something but rather prohibits it? These do not indicate His impotence. And, in the world things happen that He does not will but rather loathes, and these do not necessitate His impotence. If it were possible for Him to will disbelief, it necessarily follows that the unbeliever as well as the believer will have done what God has willed. And if that is the case [His willing unbelief] would be beneficial, the same as it is beneficial when a slave does what the master wishes. And it would necessarily follow that He should not punish the unbeliever but send him to Paradise along with the believer, because [the unbeliever] had also done what God willed the same as the believer had done. Thus if He prohibits disobedience it is not possible for the Wise One to prohibit what He willed, just as He would not command what He loathed. Moreover, if it could be said that He willed disobedience, then one could also say that He loves it and is pleased with it. But He says: "He likes not ingratitude from His servants; if you are grateful, He is pleased with you" (Q. 39:7).
33. Then if it is said: People say: "Whatever Allah wants is so, and whatever He does not want isn't." So, it must be that everything that perishes or exists is by virtue of what He wants. Say to him: What those people say is not an argument. If one could argue on the basis of that statement then one could argue on the basis of their statement: "God's command is inexorable" (la maradda li-'amri llah), meaning it is impossible to repulse what He commands. But it has been established that unbelievers do repulse God's command. Therefore, its interpretation should be that "there is no resistance to what He does." Similarly, the interpretation of their statement: "Whatever Allah wants is so" should be: "Whatever God wants to do must be."
34. Then if it is asked: What do you say about the affliction of the children of polytheists, do you allow that God would do it? Say to him: May God protect [me] from permitting that of him, for it would be an injustice and an [act of] insolence, and He is far removed from such things. What God has said indicates this: "No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another" (Q. 6:164, 17:15), and "for every soul to receive its reward by the measure of its endeavor" (Q. 20:15), and "Every soul earns only its own account" (Q. 6:164), and "nor would [We] send our wrath until we had sent a messenger [to give warning]" (Q. 17:15); and [anyway], messengers are not sent to children. The Prophet said: "The pen is raised in three instances: a man sleeping until he awakens, a child until he reaches puberty; and an insane person until he recuperates." One for whom the pen has been raised has no sin (dhanb) for which to be punished. Moreover, [divine] punishment is morally good only for one who has committed a sin, just as those who misbehave are disciplined in the visible world. Now, a child is without sin, so, how can it be said that God would punish him?
35. Then if it is asked: He punishes him for his father's sin? Say to him: It is impossible to punish someone for someone else's sin, just as it would not be morally good to punish and beat one man for the misbehavior and injustice of another.
36. Then if it is asked: Has God not said: "And they will breed none but wicked ungrateful ones" (Q. 71:27)? Say to him: He intends [in this verse] that only those who become wicked and ungrateful, when they mature, should not breed; He does not mean that they have this attribute (sifa) when they are born.
37. Then if it is asked: Is it not the case that in this world (al-dunya) children are virtually the same as their fathers in regard to disbelief? Hence, are they not under virtually the same rule as their fathers in the hereafter (al-akhira) regarding [divine] punishment? Say to him: If what you said were possible, one could also say that if [the father] committed adultery [the child] should be flogged and if [the father] committed murder, [the child] should be killed, because he is under the same rule as his father. If that is not valid then what you asserted is faulted; he only has the same judgment as his father, however, in that which does not relate to divine punishment. As for divine punishments, God preserve us!
38. Then if it is asked: Does God recompense them for these diseases and sicknesses he causes, or not? Say to him: Verily, if He caused sickness, He would turn it into greater advantage in the hereafter. If that were not so then it would not be ethically good for Him to cause animals and children to be sick, just as it would not be ethically good for us to hire somebody and work him to exhaustion without paying him his wage.
39. Then if it is asked: Thus, is there a lesson and benefit from these sicknesses for humans (al-mukallafin) or not? Say to him: Yes, because when a man is sick he is much more likely to be mindful of disobedience, fearing the Hellfire, and to act obediently desiring Paradise. God stated this warning: "See they not that they are tested every year [once or twice? Yet they turn not in repentance and they take no heed]" (Q.).
40. Then if it is asked: Are you saying that God has threatened grave sinners (al-fusaq) with Hellfire? Say to him: Yes, because God said: "Those who unjustly consume the property of orphans, shall consume a fire into their own bodies: they will soon be enduring a blazing fire" (Q. 4:10). And He said: "Consume not your property among yourselves in vanities; but let there be amongst you trade by mutual good will: Nor kill yourselves: for verily Allah has been to you Most Merciful! If any do that in rancor and injustice, soon shall we cast them into the Hellfire: And easy it is for God" (Q. 4:29–30). And He said: "If any does turn his back to them on such a day unless it be in a stratagem of war, or to retreat to a troop (of his own)—draws on himself the wrath of God, and his abode is Hell—an evil refuge (indeed)" (Q. 8:16)! These passages indicate that those who commit sins of great magnitude (al-kaba'ir) will be the People of Hell.
46. Then if it is asked: Are you saying that those [who commit grave sins] will be in Hellfire eternally and they will remain there forever, or will they be let out? Say to him: Indeed, they will be there eternally according to what Allah informs us in His Book: "But those who disobey Allah and His messenger and transgress His limits will be admitted to a fire, to abide therein eternally" (Q. 4:14)! And He said: "If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is the Hellfire, to abide therein [forever]: and the wrath of Allah is upon him" (Q.). And He said: "And the wicked—they will be in the Hellfire, which they will enter on the Day of Judgment, and they will not be able to keep away therefrom" (Q. 82:14–16). This clarifies the fact that they will not be absent from the Hellfire.
47. Then if it is asked: It is narrated from the Prophet in several reports (akhbar) that a group of people will leave the Hellfire. Say to him: There cannot occur on the basis of reports attested unilaterally (akhbar ahadiyya) [...] reports that contradict their claim. When they are contradicted we should refer to the Book of God, and we have just explained passages that indicate the eternity [of the Hellfire].
48. Then if it is asked: But God said: "Those who are wretched shall be in the Hellfire: There will be for them therein [nothing but] the heaving of sighs and sobs. They will dwell therein for all the time that the Heavens and the Earth endure, except as your Lord wishes" (Q. 11:106–107). This indicates that they will not abide there forever. Say to him: If this indicated what you said, the following saying of His would so indicate: "As for those who are gladdened on the Last Day, they shall be in Paradise [eternally so long as the Heavens and the Earth endure, except as God wills, a gift that can't be cut off]" (Q. 11:108). If that is not an indication concerning the People of Paradise, similarly neither is what you said. God intended only to make remote their departure from the Hellfire by correlating it with the duration of the Heavens and the Earth because that is remote, according to the lexicographers. As the poet has said:
When crow's feathers turn gray,
I shall go back to my family
And tar has turned into a pure milk.
49. Then if it is asked: What does His saying mean: "Allah forgives not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgives anything else, to whom He pleases" (Q. 4:48)? Say to him: It means that God does not forgive polytheism (shirk), but that nonetheless He forgives what He wishes to, if it is among the lesser sins (al-sagha'ir). God has explained: "If you avoid the gravest sins (al-kaba'ir) which you are forbidden to do, we shall expiate your misdeeds from you" (Q. 4:31).
50. Then if it is asked: Has God not said: "Say: O my servants who in their prodigality have harmed themselves! Despair not of the mercy of God, who forgives all sins" (Q. 39:53). What does that mean? Say to him: Its meaning is that you should not despair of God's mercy when there is repentance. To this He said: "Turn to your Lord in repentance and submit to Him before the punishment comes on you" (Q. 39:54).
51. Then if it is asked: Are you claiming that there is intercession (al-shafa'a) and do you believe in it? Say to him: Yes, but it is for the believers, not for grave sinners (fasiqun), because God has reported that He will cast the grave sinner into eternal Hellfire. He says: "The wrongdoers have no close friend and no intercessor who will be obeyed" (Q.). And He says: "The wrongdoers have no helpers" (Q. 2:270). And He says: "And they offer no intercession except for those who are acceptable" (Q.). All of that indicates that the grave sinner has no intercession, and that the Prophet intercedes on behalf of believers.
52. Then if it is asked: What is the use (al-fa'ida) of his intercession on behalf of the believers if they are the People of Paradise? Say to him: By his intercession for them, God will increase their level and stature in Paradise, and that is in honor of the Messenger of God, thus this is a great benefit.
53. Then if it is said: Intercession is only for those who are being harmed or are in prison, thus one intercedes in order to end those things. Why then do you say: "There is no intercession for grave sinners"? Say to him: Intercession in the visible world (al-shahid) might concern the increase of stature and merit, just as one of us petitions someone else and thereby requests an increase in his rank and stature.
54. Then if it is asked: The Prophet said "My intercession is for the serious sinners (ahl l-kaba'ir) in my community." Why don't you say that? Say to him: It is not possible to substitute for what is manifest in the Book of God a report whose validity cannot be decided. If [the report] were valid, it would mean that one who commits serious sins and then repents would be among the people [for whom there] was intercession, so that no one would presume that the intercession is only for those who always obeyed God, and from whom there was never any great or small disobedience.
[V. The Intermediate Position]
55. Then if it is asked: Why did you say that one who fornicates (zana) and murders is a grave sinner, not a believer? Say to him: Because our saying "believer" in Islamic law (Shari'a) is a noun of praise, for it is [in this sense] that God mentions [believer] in His Book and correlates it with praise saying: "Successful (aflaha) are the believers" (Q. 23:1), and He says: "The believers are those only who, when God is mentioned [their hearts feel fear, and when His verses are recited to them it increases their faith, and who trust in their Lord, who perform the prayer and spend freely of that which We have given them]. They are the ones who in truth are the believers" (Q. 8:2–4). Therefore, if a man intends to praise someone else, he says: "He is an excellent believer (mu'min fadil)." If that is valid, and it is established that the grave sinner deserves blame, cursing and scorn, it follows necessarily that we do not call him a believer, just like we do not call him excellent. When we mean or linguistically that a man is called [a believer], and [the one who calls him that] intends thereby that [the man] gives credence to God (musaddiq li-llah), then we stipulate therefore [the man's] speech. Hence, we say: "He believes in God, His Messenger and what His revelation stipulates."
56. Then if it is asked: Why did you say that a grave sinner is not an unbeliever? Say to him: If he were an unbeliever, [Islamic] legislation (ahkam) for unbelievers, such as the poll tax [for non-Muslims] (jizya), war [against non-Muslims], and prisoners [of war] would be applied to him, and he could not be buried in the cemetery for Muslims, nor receive the [funeral] prayer. And if grave sin occurred after virtue (salah), he would have to be an apostate (murtadd) who is called to repent and thus repents, and if not, then killed just as would be done to unbelievers. And since [such things] are invalid according to the consensus (ijma') of the community, we know that [the grave sinner] is not [of the same status as] an unbeliever.
57. Then if it is asked: Do you say, then, that he is a hypocrite (munafiq)? Say to him: No, because "hypocrite" is a name for one who hides unbelief within himself while manifesting submission [to God (al-islam)], and the grave sinner does not hide within himself the contrary of what he manifests, so how [can it] be said that he is a hypocrite? If all of that were not the case, we would know that he was a grave sinner. We name him a grave sinner only because of his exchange of friendship with God for enmity, and obedience toward God for disobedience. It is said of a mouse that she is "a tiny thing getting out" (fuwaysiqa) when she goes out from her cave in order to cause harm and corruption.
58. Then if it is asked: What do you say about the punishment in the grave; do you believe in that? Say to him: Yes, because God has said that which so indicates, saying: "Our Lord! Twice have you made us die" (Q. 40:11) and His saying: "They will be exposed to the Hellfire morning and evening, and on that Day when the Hour comes up, [it will be said]: 'Cast the People of Pharaoh into the severest torture'" (Q. 40:46). And many reports were also narrated from the Prophet; such as, what has been related concerning the story "Munkar and Nakir" and that the interrogation will take place in the grave; and such as the narratives about the weighing of man's deeds at the Resurrection even though that is impossible because [the deeds] are past and no longer extant; and that God places a mark of light [indicating] good deeds on one pan of the scale, and mark of darkness on the other indicating bad deeds. And if the pan bearing light weighs in heavier we know that [that person] belongs to the inhabitants of Paradise; if the pan bearing darkness weighs in heavier, we know that he belongs to the inhabitants of the Hellfire. And they say that God will make them accountable and inquire [about them]. And we maintain that the Path (al-sirat) is a way [both] to Paradise and to the Hellfire.
[VI. Commanding the Good and Prohibiting Evil]
59. Then if it is asked: Do you say that one who does not prohibit wrongdoing has disobeyed God? Say to him: That is possible for him when he knows about it and it is his view that in accepting it, it becomes incumbent [upon him], and that in omitting it, it becomes disobedience. Similar is commanding the good; if he were afraid for his [own safety], it would not be incumbent upon him. If, after that, he denounced wrongdoing and manifested the truth (al-haqq) he has done good. If not, it devolves upon him [to do so].
[A. Political Theology: the Imamate]
60. Then if it is asked: What do you say concerning the imamate? Say to him: We say that the Imams after the Messenger were Abu Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uthman, and then 'Ali ibn Abi Talib. [This is] on the basis of what is established by his statement that 'Ali ibn Abi Talib was the Imam, according to what is established by reports and traditions. As for talk about which one was superior, there is no evidence [that proves] any one of them was superior, even though those who [otherwise] are [blameless in this matter] have strong opinions and err in denouncing him, such as the Rafida and the Khawarij.
[B. The Validity of Tradition]
61. Then if it is asked: What do you say about the reports that they narrate, do you accept all of them or not? Say to him: We declare [as true] all that is established by multilateral reports (al-akhbar al-mutawatira), [by] which we know what the Messenger of God has said. And that which was narrated by one or two [transmitters only], or by one for whom error was possible, [such reports] are unacceptable in religions (al-diyanat) but they are acceptable in the proceedings of positive law (or "branches," fi furu' l-fiqh) as long as the narrator is trustworthy, competent, just, and he has not contradicted what is narrated in the Book, and is not subject to any proscription. And that which is transmitted in conflict with the Book and rational evidence we will interpret metaphorically in a sound manner, just as we interpret the Book of God in accord with rational proof, not with that which is in conflict with it.
[C. God's Decree]
62. Then if it is asked: Do you say that God determines (qada) and decrees (qaddara) every good and evil, sweet and bitter thing? Say to him: We say that God determines every prosperity (al-rakha') and misfortune (al-shidda) and other things besides [in that which] He has created. As for disobedience and unbelief, God forbid that He would create, decree, and determine them, except in the sense that He informs us about them, as He has said: "And We decreed for the Children of Israel in the Book" (Q. 17:4), which means: We informed them. As for [their] saying "He decreed" means He created and enforced, that is absurd. How is it possible that He is pleased with (radiya) the unbeliever, then incites against him? And how is it possible concerning God's determination that satisfaction [with it] does not occur, when it has been established by the umma that satisfaction with God's determination is obligatory?
[D. Repentance and Faith]
63. Then if it is asked: Do you say that whoever disobeys God and disbelieves and commits grave sin, then repents, his repentance will be accepted? Say to him: Yes, because God says: "Those who invoke no other god with Allah [nor take any life which God has forbidden except in righteousness, nor fornicate—for whoever does that shall pay the price. The punishment for him shall be doubled on the Day of Resurrection, and he will eternally abide therein in disdain. Save he who repents and believes and works] righteous deeds." Just as one who does evil to someone else, then he excuses [himself] with a real excuse, his plea will be accepted, and also if he repents, his repentance will be accepted.
64. Then if it is asked: What is the attribute of repentance (tawba)? Say to him: It is to repent of past disobedience because it was [one's own] disobedience. If one repented of another's disobedience, it would not be accepted, the same as when someone apologizes to someone else who wrongs him [...] and by virtue of this [he assists him (nasarahu?)] or [...] he profits from it, [the one to whom he apologized] is not obligated to accept his apology.
65. Then if it is asked: Are you saying that whoever repents, his punishment will be abolished and he becomes one of the People of Paradise? Say to him: Yes, if his repentance is valid he will be excluded from the Hellfire and he will be one of the People of Paradise, unless he returns to his disobedience toward God.
66. Then if it is asked: Do human beings profit from obedience (ta'a) [even] if they are unbelievers or grave sinners? Say to him: They do not deserve reward, although it would necessitate decreasing their punishment, just as God has said: "If you avoid the greatest [sins] which you are forbidden to do [We will pardon your evil deeds and make you to enter at a noble gate]" (Q.).
67. Then if it is asked: Do you say that faith increases and decreases, and that it [consists in] the performance of the limbs and the conviction in the heart and the speaking of the tongue? Say to him: Yes, because every duty which belongs to faith is either the speaking of the tongue or the performance of limbs or conviction in the heart. Hence, God says: "For believers are those who, when Allah is mentioned, feel a tremor in their hearts. [And when they hear His signs rehearsed, find their faith strengthened; they trust in their Lord. Who establish the prayers and spend (freely) out of the gifts We have given them for sustenance.] Such in truth are the believers" (Q. 8:2–4). He made an increase in faith, but a decrease is possible. The Prophet said: "One who is not trustworthy has no faith." It has been established that all that we call faith increases and decreases, because religious duties performed by some worshippers are greater than [those performed] by others, and some do more than others.
This [entire] statement [above] is sufficient for those who wish to cover all of "unity and justice."
This is [now] complete. Praise God, the Mighty and Benevolent, and may prayers and peace be upon our Master, Muhammad.
Copied on Wednesday [...] the third of the month of Shawwal in the year AH 1108 [1696 CE] with the help of my master, the Qadi al-'Arif Sharaf al-Din al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Makhidi al-Qadi al-'Arif, in the city of 'Imran, may God protect it, [and may He] make him and us successful, for the appropriateness of [our] works by virtue of the truth (al-haqq) of the Prophet, the Chosen One, and his family, the pure ones, and praise God, Lord of the Worlds.
[Written] by the hand of a poor soul (faqir) for his Lord, confessing his sins, 'Ali Abdallah al-'Anari.
Organized into Theme.
Obligation to Know God Through Speculative Reasoning.
The primary duty God places on individuals is to engage in speculative reasoning, which guides them to knowledge of God. This knowledge cannot be gained intuitively or through sensory perception, so reflection and contemplation are essential. Such reasoning is mandatory to prevent disobedience and destruction, allowing people to fulfill acts of obedience. It takes precedence over other religious duties because revelation's commands about speech and action hold no value without first knowing God. For instance, prayer lacks meaning if one does not know the recipient.
God's Initial Grace and Its Implications.
God's first grace to humanity defies full enumeration, but it encompasses creating living beings and endowing them with power, physical tools, perfected natures, passions, and the capacity to enjoy various pleasures. He then delivers commands and prohibitions to enable attainment of rewards and entry into the Heavens. Consequently, recognizing His existence becomes necessary for worship, gratitude, fulfillment of His will, and avoidance of disobedience.
Proofs Leading to Knowledge of God.
Speculation on God's knowledge relies on evidentiary proofs, comprising four sources: rational arguments, scripture, the Prophet's example, and communal consensus. Rational arguments must come first, as knowledge of God's truthfulness is required to validate the authenticity of the Book, the Sunna, and consensus.
Rational Proof from One's Own Existence.
The key rational proof emerges from examining one's own being, which exists in a state of perfection. Individuals can create entities similar to themselves or parts of their form, yet they could not originate themselves from a mere drop of sperm. This reveals a good creator and designer distinct from the self, who is God. Bodies exhibit motion, rest, contiguity, and separation—all contingent qualities—confirming that bodies themselves are contingent and not eternal.
The Five Fundamentals of Religion.
Religion rests on five core fundamentals: unity, justice, promise and threat, intermediate position, and commanding the good while prohibiting evil. These form the bedrock of faith, and opposing them constitutes severe error, potentially leading to unbelief or grave sin. Understanding them safeguards against such pitfalls.
Divine Unity.
God's unity means acknowledging Him as the eternal creator of the world, who cannot perish, unlike humans who emerge from non-existence and can cease to exist. His being endures unchangingly, while human existence could differ. He possesses power without alteration or reliance on separate forces, unlike created beings. His omniscience remains constant, contrasting with human knowledge that arises anew. His vision equals eternal knowledge, not like human sight that reveals the unknown. His will manifests as command, distinct from human volition. He is living, hearing, and seeing, but not in ways resembling human attributes; rather, He embodies these qualities without similarity to creation.
Divine Justice.
Justice signifies God's removal from all moral wrong, with every moral good originating from Him. He does not resemble His creation in existence, attributes, or actions, ensuring His justice remains absolute.
Promise and Threat.
The promise involves God's truthful prior declaration of reward for the obedient, while the threat entails His just announcement of punishment for the disobedient. Thus, punishing the obedient or rewarding the disobedient is impossible.
The Intermediate Position.
This position describes the status of a grave sinner within the community, neither fully believer nor unbeliever, but occupying a middle ground between faith and unbelief.
Commanding the Good and Prohibiting Evil.
God prescribes rewards for those who command good and prohibit evil, under specific conditions detailed in larger works. The enjoiner must not engage in what they prohibit or forbid what they practice, adhering to additional stipulations.
Inferring God's Existence from Physical Bodies.
God created a living being and provided it with power, physical means, and enabled passions and enjoyment of pleasurable things. He issued commands and prohibitions so that one could attain rewards and enter the Heavens. Therefore, it is incumbent to establish His existence and know Him to avoid disobedience toward Him. If it is asked what reasoning imposes knowledge of God, one must engage in speculative reasoning, which leads to knowledge of Him. This knowledge is obligatory because it allows one to enjoy a variety of pleasurable things. He issued commands and prohibitions so that one could attain rewards and enter the Heavens. Therefore, recognizing His existence becomes necessary for worship, gratitude, fulfillment of His will, and avoidance of disobedience.
One must use rational arguments first, as knowledge of God's truthfulness is required to validate the authenticity of scripture, the Prophet's example, and consensus. The key rational proof emerges from examining one's own being, which exists in a state of perfection. Bodies exhibit motion, rest, contiguity, and separation, all contingent qualities, confirming that bodies are contingent and not eternal. If it is asked what the proof is that God is unique with no attributes or actions resembling creation, the answer lies in understanding that He is the eternal creator who cannot perish, unlike humans who emerge from non-existence.
God's unity means acknowledging Him as the eternal creator of the world. His being endures unchangingly, while human existence could differ. He possesses power without alteration or reliance on separate forces, unlike created beings. His omniscience remains constant, contrasting with human knowledge that arises anew. His vision equals eternal knowledge, not like human sight that reveals the unknown. His will manifests as command, distinct from human volition. He is living, hearing, and seeing, but not in ways resembling human attributes; rather, He embodies these qualities without similarity to creation.
Proofs of God's Existence and Attributes.
Followers must know about jurisprudence, divine logic, and isolation. The knowledge that God is being unique has attributes that no creature shares with Him. He is the most Beneficent in the name of Allah. Speculative reasoning must begin with rational arguments, as they validate scripture and consensus. Examining one's own existence reveals a good creator and designer distinct from the self. Bodies are contingent, requiring a creator who is God.
If it is asked what the proof is that bodies are contingent, the response is that motion, rest, and other qualities indicate contingency. God is incorporeal, not resembling creation in existence or actions. His attributes like power, knowledge, and will are eternal and not like human ones. He is the powerful one who acts autonomously. His power is valid on God's part, so it must be said that He is qadir with the power to act.
God is asked what skillful acts are the proof that God is omniscient. Writing and crafts can only be done by one who knows how. And since it is true for God, in creating human beings, to exceed the wonderful, He must be omniscient. Then if it is asked what the proof is that He is living, the answer is because He has power and knowledge, which require life. He is hearing and seeing because He knows all that can be heard and seen.
Divine Justice and Human Actions.
God does not punish the obedient or reward the disobedient. Punishing the obedient or rewarding the disobedient is impossible. Justice signifies God's removal from all moral wrong, with every moral good originating from Him. He does not resemble His creation in existence, attributes, or actions, ensuring His justice remains absolute.
If it is asked whether God does injustice or lies, the response is no, because that would make Him similar to creation, which is impossible. God is just and truthful. He does not do what is morally wrong or lie. His actions are always good. If He did wrong, it would imply He is not self-sufficient, but He is.
Human actions are contingent, and God is the creator of all acts. However, humans acquire their acts through power created by God. If it is asked why God punishes for acts He creates, the answer is that punishment is for the acquisition of evil acts by humans, not for God's creation.
Promise, Threat, and the Afterlife.
The promise involves God's truthful declaration of reward for the obedient, while the threat entails punishment for the disobedient. God prescribes rewards for those who command good and prohibit evil, under specific conditions. The enjoiner must not engage in what they prohibit.
If it is asked what the proof is of the afterlife, the response draws from scripture and reason. God has promised reward and threatened punishment, and since He is truthful, these must occur. The Quran provides evidence, such as verses about resurrection and judgment.
God will resurrect bodies and reunite them with souls. The righteous will enter Paradise, enjoying eternal bliss, while the wicked will face Hellfire, suffering punishment. Grave sinners occupy an intermediate position, neither fully believers nor unbelievers.
Commanding Good and Prohibiting Evil.
God commands the good and prohibits evil as a religious duty. It is obligatory under certain conditions, like knowledge and safety. One must enjoin good and forbid evil to prevent corruption.
If it is asked why God allows evil, the response is that He tests humans and grants free will. Evil acts are acquisitions by humans, and God punishes accordingly. He is not unjust in allowing trials.
Definition of Divine Justice.
God is just, meaning He is removed from all moral wrong, and every moral good originates from Him. He does not resemble His creation in existence, attributes, or actions, ensuring His justice is absolute. If asked whether God does injustice or lies, the answer is no, as that would make Him similar to creation, which is impossible. God is self-sufficient and does not need to do wrong; doing so would imply deficiency, but He is perfect.
Proofs Against God Committing Injustice.
The proof that God does not commit injustice lies in His dissimilarity to creation. Injustice is a human quality, and God cannot possess it without becoming like His creatures. Scripture supports this, with the Quran stating God does not wrong anyone and is the most just. Rational argument shows that if God did wrong, it would not benefit Him, as He is exalted above needs. He created the world for humanity's benefit, not His own, so He has no motive for injustice. If He punished the obedient or rewarded the disobedient, it would contradict His wisdom and truthfulness.
God's Creation of Human Acts and Responsibility.
Human actions are created by God, but humans acquire them through power He grants. Punishment is for the acquisition of evil acts by humans, not for God's creation itself. If asked why God punishes acts He creates, the response is that He punishes the human choice to acquire wrong, while the act's creation is neutral. God provides the capacity for choice, and humans are accountable for directing it toward good or evil. This maintains justice, as reward and punishment align with human volition.
Reasons for Allowing Evil and Suffering.
God allows evil to test humans and grant free will, but He is not unjust in doing so. Evil acts are human acquisitions, and God punishes them accordingly. If asked why God creates harmful things like sickness or pain, it is because they serve purposes like warning or testing faith. For instance, sickness encourages repentance, and natural disasters remind of the afterlife. God compensates the suffering with rewards in Paradise, ensuring overall justice. He does not create evil for its own sake but as part of a wise design benefiting believers.
Divine Commands and Prohibitions.
God commands good and prohibits evil as a duty, obligatory under conditions like knowledge and safety. Enjoining good and forbidding evil prevents corruption and earns rewards. If asked why God imposes obligations, it is to guide toward reward and avoid punishment. Obligations do not burden beyond capacity, and God provides grace to fulfill them. Disobedience leads to just punishment, but repentance can avert it.
The Problem of the Grave Sinner.
A grave sinner occupies an intermediate position, neither fully believer nor unbeliever. Punishment for grave sins is possible but not eternal if faith remains. God may pardon through intercession or mercy, but justice demands accountability. If asked about Hellfire for sinners, it is temporary for those with faith, leading to eventual Paradise.
Quranic and Rational Evidences.
The Quran provides proofs, such as verses declaring God does no injustice and promises fair judgment. Rational speculation confirms this: God's attributes like omniscience and power ensure just actions. For example, creating the world without need shows benevolence, and resurrection for judgment upholds equity. Prophets like Muhammad exemplified justice, and consensus among scholars affirms God’s fairness.
Promise and Threat in Divine Justice.
The promise refers to God's truthful announcement of rewards for those who obey Him, while the threat involves His just declaration of punishment for the disobedient. Punishing the obedient or rewarding the disobedient would be impossible, as it contradicts God's wisdom and truthfulness. These principles ensure that divine recompense aligns with human actions, motivating gratitude and avoidance of sin.
Proof of the Afterlife.
God has promised Paradise for the righteous and threatened Hell for wrongdoers, and since He is truthful, these outcomes must occur. Rational evidence supports this: creating humanity without accountability would render existence futile, but God's benevolence implies a purpose, including judgment. The Quran affirms resurrection, stating that God will revive the dead as He first created them, reuniting bodies with souls for fair reckoning.
Resurrection of Bodies.
God will resurrect physical bodies on the Day of Judgment, restoring them from dust to face accountability. He demonstrates this power through initial creation from a drop of fluid and examples like reviving dead land with rain. Denying resurrection equates to denying God's omnipotence, as He who originates life can recreate it. The resurrected will emerge from graves, responding to the call, and stand before Him for evaluation.
Rewards in Paradise.
The obedient will enter Paradise, enjoying eternal bliss with gardens, rivers, fruits, and companionship. God promises this as a just reward for faith and good deeds, compensating for worldly trials. No fatigue or harm will affect them there; instead, they experience perpetual peace and fulfillment. Believers who repent sincerely may also attain this, as God's mercy encompasses those who turn back to Him.
Punishments in Hell.
Grave sinners face Hell's torment, including fire, boiling water, and chains, as punishment for disbelief and evil acts. God threatens this for injustices like consuming orphans' property or associating partners with Him. Punishment fits the crime, with eternal suffering for unbelievers but potential relief for believers who sinned. The Quran describes Hell as a place of regret, where the wicked plead for relief but receive none.
Punishment in the Grave.
After death, sinners endure grave torment as a foretaste of Hell, involving physical and spiritual anguish. This occurs for those who disobeyed, serving as a warning and partial justice. The obedient, however, rest peacefully in the grave, protected until resurrection. Evidence comes from prophetic reports and rational necessity, as delayed accountability would undermine divine justice.
Intercession on Judgment Day.
The Prophet will intercede for believers who committed grave sins, pleading for their forgiveness and entry into Paradise. This intercession is a mercy granted by God, not for unbelievers or hypocrites, but for those with faith despite flaws. It does not negate justice; rather, it highlights God's compassion, allowing elevation of status or reduction of punishment for the repentant.
Conditions for Forgiveness.
God forgives sins except associating partners with Him, provided sincere repentance occurs before death. Polytheists and unrepentant wrongdoers face eternal Hell, but believers who err may receive pardon through intercession or mercy. Repentance involves regret, cessation of sin, and resolve to improve, opening the door to divine forgiveness and reward.
The Status of the Grave Sinner.
God describes believers in terms of praise, stating that successful are the believers, and emphasizing that they are those whose hearts feel fear when God is mentioned, whose faith increases when His verses are recited to them, who trust in their Lord, perform prayer, and spend freely from what He has given them. They are the ones who in truth are the believers. Therefore, a person who commits grave sins like fornication or murder cannot be called a believer in the legal sense, as this term signifies praise and excellence, while such a sinner deserves blame, cursing, and scorn. Linguistically, one might say the sinner gives credence to God, His Messenger, and divine revelation, but in religious law, the label of believer does not apply.
Distinction from Unbelief.
If the grave sinner were an unbeliever, legal rulings for unbelievers would apply, including the poll tax, warfare against them, and imprisonment as captives. The sinner could not be buried in Muslim cemeteries or receive funeral prayers. If grave sin followed a period of virtue, the person would be treated as an apostate, called to repent, and killed if refusing, just as with unbelievers. Since consensus in the community invalidates these applications to the grave sinner, it confirms that this person is not an unbeliever.
Rejection of Hypocrisy.
The grave sinner is not a hypocrite, as hypocrisy involves hiding unbelief while outwardly manifesting submission to God. The sinner does not conceal unbelief or present a false exterior contrary to inner reality. Thus, the label of hypocrite does not fit.
The Obligation to Enjoin Good and Forbid Evil.
God commands believers to promote what is right and prevent what is wrong as a fundamental religious duty. This obligation arises from divine revelation and reason, requiring individuals to act when they witness moral violations or opportunities for goodness. Failure to fulfill this duty constitutes disobedience, leading to divine displeasure and potential punishment, while performing it earns reward and aligns with faith's core principles.
Conditions for Fulfilling the Duty.
The duty to enjoin good and forbid evil is not absolute but depends on specific conditions. One must possess knowledge of the act's moral status, believe in its importance, and have the ability to intervene without causing greater harm. For example, if prohibiting wrongdoing would lead to personal danger or escalate evil, it may be excused. The enjoiner should approach the task with wisdom, starting with gentle advice and escalating only if necessary, always avoiding hypocrisy by practicing what they preach.
Consequences and Scope of the Obligation.
Neglecting this duty when conditions are met results in sin, as it allows corruption to spread within the community. The obligation extends to all capable believers, encompassing personal, social, and public spheres, such as correcting family members, neighbors, or even rulers. God holds individuals accountable based on their capacity, ensuring justice in judgment. Success in this duty contributes to societal reform and personal spiritual growth, while failure invites divine retribution in this life or the hereafter.
The Role of Leadership in Enjoining Good.
Effective enforcement of enjoining good and forbidding evil requires structured leadership to guide the community and resolve disputes. The rightful imams after the Prophet are identified as Abu Bakr, followed by Umar, Uthman, and Ali ibn Abi Talib, based on their merits and community consensus. These leaders exemplify the principle by upholding justice, combating oppression, and promoting piety. Obedience to legitimate authority is part of this duty, but rebellion against unjust rulers may be warranted if they violate divine commands, provided it aims to restore righteousness without causing chaos.
Political Implications and the Imamate.
The principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil has profound political dimensions, justifying the establishment of an imamate to safeguard faith and morality. The imam must be knowledgeable, just, and capable of leading jihad against tyranny or unbelief. If a ruler deviates from righteousness, the community has a collective responsibility to correct or replace them through consultation and action. This ensures the umma remains united under divine guidance, preventing fitna and fostering a society where good prevails over evil.