Skepticism or scepticism (see spelling differences) is generally any questioning attitude towards unempirical knowledge or opinions/beliefs stated as facts,^[1] or doubt regarding claims that are taken for granted elsewhere.^[2]

Philosophical skepticism is a general philosophy that requires all information to be well supported by evidence.^[3] Classical philosophical skepticism derives from the 'Skeptikoi', a school who "asserted nothing".^[4] Adherents of Pyrrhonism (and more recently, partially synonymous with Fallibilism), for instance, suspend judgment in investigations.^[5] Skeptics may even doubt the reliability of their own senses.^[6]Religious skepticism, on the other hand, is "doubt concerning basic religious principles (such as immortality, providence, and revelation)".^[7] Scientific skepticism is about testing scientific beliefs for reliability, by subjecting them to systematic investigation using thescientific method, to discover empirical evidence for them.

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Definition
• 2 Philosophical skepticism
• 3 Scientific skepticism
• 4 Religious skepticism
• 5 See also
  • 5.1 Literary skeptics
  • 5.2 Organizations
  • 5.3 Media
• 6 Notes
• 7 Sources
• 8 Further reading
• 9 External links

Definition[edit]

In ordinary usage, skepticism (US) or scepticism (UK) (Greek: 'σκέπτομαι' skeptomai, to think, to look about, to consider; see also spelling differences) refers to:

1. an attitude of doubt or a disposition to incredulity either in general or toward a particular object;
2. the doctrine that true knowledge or some particular knowledge is uncertain; or
3. the method of suspended judgment, systematic doubt, or criticism that is characteristic of skeptics (Merriam–Webster).

In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about:

1. an inquiry,
2. a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing,
3. the arbitrariness, relativity, or subjectivity of moral values,
4. the limitations of knowledge,
5. a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment.

Philosophical skepticism[edit]

Main article: Philosophical skepticism

In philosophical skepticism, pyrrhonism is a position that refrains from making truth claims. A philosophical skeptic does not claim that truth is impossible (which itself would be a truth claim), instead it recommends "suspending belief". The term is commonly used to describe philosophies which are similar to philosophical skepticism, such as academic skepticism, an ancient variant of Platonism that claimed knowledge of truth was impossible. Empiricism is a closely related, but not identical, philosophy to philosophical skepticism. Empiricists claim empiricism is a pragmatic compromise between philosophical skepticism and nomothetic science; philosophical skepticism is in turn sometimes referred to as "radical empiricism."

Western Philosophical skepticism originated in ancient Greek philosophy.^[8] The Greek Sophists of the 5th century BC were partially skeptics.

Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 BC) is usually credited with initiating skepticism. He traveled to India and studied with the "gymnosophists" (naked lovers of wisdom), which could have been any number of Indian sects. From there, he brought back the idea that nothing can be known for certain. The senses are easily fooled, and reason follows too easily our desires.^[9] Pyrrhonism was a school of skepticism founded by his follower Aenesidemus in the first century BC and recorded by Sextus Empiricus in the late 2nd century or early 3rd century AD. Subsequently, in the "New Academy" Arcesilaus (c. 315-241 BC) and Carneades (c. 213-129 BC) developed more theoretical perspectives by which conceptions of absolute truth and falsity were refuted as uncertain. Carneades criticized the claims of the Dogmatists, especially supporters of Stoicism, asserting that absolute certainty of knowledge is impossible. Sextus Empiricus (c. AD 200), the main authority for Greek skepticism, developed the philosophy further, incorporating aspects of empiricism into the basis for asserting knowledge.

Greek skeptics criticized the Stoics, accusing them of dogmatism. For the skeptics, the logical mode of argument was untenable, as it relied on propositions which could not be said to be either true or false without relying on further propositions. This was the regress argument, whereby every proposition must rely on other propositions in order to maintain its validity (see the five tropes of Agrippa the Sceptic). In addition, the skeptics argued that two propositions could not rely on each other, as this would create a circular argument (as p implies q and q implies p). For the skeptics, such logic was thus an inadequate measure of truth and could create as many problems as it claimed to have solved. Truth was not, however, necessarily unobtainable, but rather an idea which did not yet exist in a pure form. Although skepticism was accused of denying the possibility of truth, in fact it appears to have mainly been a critical school which merely claimed that logicians had not discovered truth.

In Islamic philosophy, skepticism was established by Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), known in the West as "Algazel", as part of the Ash'ari school of Islamic theology, whose method of skepticism shares many similarities with Descartes' method.^[10]

In an effort to avoid skepticism, René Descartes begins his Meditations on First Philosophy attempting to find indubitable truth on which to base his knowledge. He later recognizes this truth as "I think, therefore I am," but before he finds this truth, he briefly entertains the skeptical arguments fromdreaming and radical deception.

David Hume has also been described as a skeptic.

Pierre Le Morvan (2011) has distinguished between three philosophical reactions to skepticism. The first he terms the "Foil Approach." According to this approach, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism's value according to this method, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge and justified belief. The second he calls the "Bypass Approach" according to which skepticism is bypassed as a major concern of epistemology. Le Morvan advocates a third approach—- he dubs it the "Health Approach"—- that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not, or when it is virtuous and when it is vicious.

Ājīvika (also written Ajivika or Ajivaka, literally means "living" in Sanskrit) was a system of ancient Indian philosophy and an ascetic movement of the Mahajanapada period in the Indian subcontinent. Ājīvika was primarily a heterodox Indian (Nāstika) system. The Ājīvikas may simply have been a more loosely-organized group of wandering ascetics (shramanas or sannyasins). Some of its prominent figures were Makkhali Gosala and Sanjaya Belatthaputta.

Ājīvika is thought to be contemporaneous to other early Indian nāstika philosophical schools of thought, such as Cārvāka, Jainism and Buddhism. While the early nāstika systems such as Cārvāka and Ājīvika gradually became extinct or evolved into others, the Jain and Buddhist traditions spun off into what may be described today as separate religions, distinct from Hinduism (which is now restrictively meant to encompass only the six orthodox Āstikaphilosophical systems).

Ājīvika reached the height of its popularity during the rule of the Mauryan emperor Bindusara around the 4th century BC. Several rock-cut caves belonging to this sect, built during the times of the Mauryan emperor Ashoka (r. 273 BC to 232 BC) have been found at Barabar Caves, Jehanabad district, Bihar.^[2]

Sources[edit]

Having being extinct for a long time, what information is known about the Ājīvika movement is primarily from historical references left behind in Jain and Buddhist sources, that may therefore be hostile to it. According to some of these sources, the Ājīvikas believed that a cycle of reincarnation of the soul was determined by a precise and non-personal cosmic principle called niyati (destiny or fate) that was completely independent of the person's actions. The same sources therefore make them out to be strict fatalists, who did not believe inkarma.

More recent work by scholars suggests that the Ajivika were perhaps misrepresented by Jain and Buddhist sources.

[Johannes Bronkhorst's] claim is that, whereas the Jains teach that one can both stop the influx of new karma and rid oneself of old karma through ascetic practice, Gosāla taught that one could only stop the influx of new karma. [...] Ascetic practice can be effective in preventing further karmic influx, which helps to explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that the Ājīvikas did practice asceticism. [...] [T]he popularity of the Ājīvika doctrine in ancient times, such that it could rival that of both Jainism and Buddhism, also make sense if this doctrine was really not so radically different from these traditions as its presentation in Jain and Buddhist sources suggests.^[3]

Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. The earliest direct quote from Bṛhaspati's lost writings is found in the text Sarvasiddhantasamgraha, which is sometimes controversially attributed to Adi Shankara. In theSarvasiddhantasamgraha, the author quotes Brihaspati as follows:

Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings; gifts of gold and land, the pleasure of invitations to dinner, are devised by indigent people with stomachs lean with hunger.
.
The building of temples, houses for water-supply, tanks, wells, resting places, and the like, please only travelers, not others.
.
The Agnihotra ritual, the three Vedas, the triple staff, the ash-smearing, are the ways of gaining a livelihood for those who are lacking in intellect and energy.
.
The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the more appropriate available means of agriculture, tending cattle, trade, political administration, etc.

Bṛhaspati (Sanskrit: बृहस्पति, "lord of prayer or devotion",^[1] often written as Brihaspati or Bruhaspati) also known as Deva-guru(guru of the gods), is a Hindu god and a Vedic deity. He is considered the personification of piety and religion, and the chief 'offerer of prayers and sacrifices to the gods' (Sanskrit: Purohita), with whom he intercedes on behalf of humankind.

He is the guru of the Devas (gods) and the nemesis of Shukracharya, the guru of the Danavas (demons). He is also known as Ganapati (leader of the group [of planets]), and Guru (teacher), the god of wisdom and eloquence, to whom various works are ascribed, such as the Barhaspatya sutras.

He is described as of yellow or golden color and holding the following divine attributes: a stick, a lotus and beads. He presides over 'Guru-var' or Thursday.^[2]

In astrology, Bṛhaspati is the regent of Jupiter and is often identified with the planet.

The Bārhaspatya-sūtras (a patronymic of Brhaspati), also Lokāyata ("materialistic", "atheistic") sutras were the foundational text of the Cārvākaschool of "materialist" (nastika) philosophy.

Probably dating to the final centuries BC (the Mauryan period), these texts have been lost, and are known only from fragmentary quotations. Dakshinaranjan Shastri in 1928 published 60 such verses. In 1959, he published 54 selected verses as Barhaspatya sutram. Shastri was of the opinion that many more fragments could be recovered. Bhattacharya (2002) attempts a new reconstruction, with the caveat that the more verses are listed, the greater the uncertainty that it will be either misquoted or foreign materials included as a part of the text.

Most of the fragments are found in works dated to the Indian Middle Ages, between roughly the 8th and 12th centuries. The extensive 14th century treatise on Indian philosophy by Sayana, the Sarvadarshanasamgraha, gives a detailed account of Cārvāka, but it doesn't quote Cārvāka texts directly, instead paraphrasing the doctrine according to the understanding of a learned 14th century Vedantin. Bhattacharya lists 68 items on 9 pages.

Cārvāka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक), also known as Lokāyata, is a system of Indian philosophy that assumes various forms of materialism, philosophical scepticism and religious indifference.^[1]

Cārvāka is classified as a heterodox Hindu (Nāstika) system.^[2][3][4] It is characterised as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought. While this branch of Indian philosophy is today not considered to be part of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy, some describe it as an atheistic or materialistic philosophical movement within Hinduism.^[5][6]

Cārvāka emerged as an alternative to the orthodox Hindu pro-Vedic Āstika schools, as well as a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous nāstika philosophies such as Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism (the latter two later spinning off into what may be described today as separate religions) in the classical period of Indian philosophy.^[7] As opposed to other schools, the first principle of Cārvāka philosophy was the rejection of inference as a means to establish metaphysical truths.^[8][9]

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Name
• 2 Origin
  • 2.1 Earliest descriptions
• 3 Philosophy
  • 3.1 Epistemology
  • 3.2 Metaphysics
  • 3.3 Consciousness and Afterlife
  • 3.4 Pleasure
  • 3.5 Religion
• 4 Works
  • 4.1 Loss of original works
• 5 Representation of Cārvāka in Āstika, Buddhist and Jain literature
• 6 See also
• 7 Notes
• 8 Bibliography
• 9 External links

Name[edit]

Etymologically, Cārvāka means "agreeable speech" or "sweet talkers" (cāru – agreeable, pleasant or sweet and vāk – speech) and Lokāyata signifies "prevalence in the world" (loka – world and āyata – prevalent).^{[10][11][12][13]}

The name Lokāyata can be traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (logical philosophies) – Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in Arthashastra, does not stand for materialism because the Arthashastra refers to Lokāyata as a part of Vedic lore. Lokāyata here probably refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism") and not to the materialist doctrine.^[14] Similarly, Saddaniti and Buddhaghosa in the 5th century connect the "Lokāyata" with the Vitandas (sophists).

It is only from about the 6th century that the term Lokāyata was restricted to the school of the materialists or Lokyātikas. The name Cārvāka was first used in the 7th century by the philosopher Purandara, who referred to his fellow materialists as "the Cārvākas", and it was used by the 8th century philosophers Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. Adi Shankara, on the other hand, always used Lokāyata, not Cārvāka.^[15] By the 8th century, the terms Cārvāka, Lokāyata, and Bārhaspatya were used interchangeably to signify materialism.^[16]

Origin[edit]

The earliest documented materialist in India is Ajita Kesakambali, a senior contemporary of the Buddha (sixth/fifth century BCE).^[16] The basic tenets of Cārvāka philosophy, of no soul and existence of four (not five) elements, were probably inspired from him.^[17] Although materialist schools existed before Cārvāka, it was the only school which systematised materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms.^[18]

E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924) claims that Cārvāka philosophy was contemporaneous to Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. 500 BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organised as a philosophical school, and that the name of a villain in the epic Mahabharata, Cārvāka, was attached to the position to disparage it. The earliest positive statement of scepticism is preserved from the epic period, in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (but Rāma then refutes him in chapter 109):^[19]

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

The Cārvāka school thus appears to have gradually grown out of generic scepticism in the Mauryan period, but its existence as an organised body cannot be ascertained for times predating the 6th century. The Barhaspatya sutras were likely also composed in Mauryan times, predating 150 BC, based on a reference in the Mahabhasya of Patanjali (7.3.45).^[19] Cārvāka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century AD after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace. The reason for this sudden disappearance is not known.^[16]

Earliest descriptions[edit]

Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. The earliest direct quote from Bṛhaspati's lost writings is found in the text Sarvasiddhantasamgraha, which is sometimes controversially attributed to Adi Shankara. In theSarvasiddhantasamgraha, the author quotes Brihaspati as follows:

clever weakling: Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings Hedonist: gifts of gold and land, the pleasure of invitations to dinner [Hedonism], are devised by indigent people with stomachs lean with hunger. Builders of City: The building of temples, houses for water-supply, tanks, wells, resting places, and the like, please only travelers, not others. lacking in intellect and energy: The Agnihotra ritual, the three Vedas, the triple staff, the ash-smearing, are the ways of gaining a livelihood for those who are lacking in intellect and energy.The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the more appropriate available means of agriculture, tending cattle, trade, political administration, etc.^[20]

Philosophy[edit]

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The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the only valid source of knowledge.^[21]

Epistemology[edit]

In syllogism, the middle term, which is found in both the subject (minor term) and is invariably connected with the predicate (major term), is seen as the cause of knowledge. This invariable connection between middle term and predicate is unconditional and causes inference not by virtue of its existence, like the existence of the eye is the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being known. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which this connection could be known and therefore the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could not be established.^[8]

To prove that inference was not a reliable means of knowledge Cārvākas examined and refuted each of the various means of knowing the connection between the middle term and the predicate individually:

• External perception, or perception which involves the use of the senses, could not be the required means because although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object could produce the knowledge of the particular object, there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future. Therefore if external perception were the means on knowing the connection then inference related to objects of the past and future could not happen.

• Internal perception, or perception which involves the mind, could not be the required means either because one cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object and is thought to be dependent on the external senses.

• Nor could inference be the means since if inference were the proof of inference, one would also require another inference to establish this inference, and so on, leading to the fallacy of an Ad infinitum regression.

• Nor could testimony be the means since testimony can be classified as a type of inference. Moreover, there is no reason for one to believe the word of another. Besides, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the connection had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference.

• Comparison (Upamana) could also be rejected as the means of the knowledge of the connection since the objective of using Upamana is to establish a different kind of knowledge than is being sought here, the relation of a name to something so named.

• Absence of a condition (Upadhi), which is given as the definition of an invariable connection to restrict too general a middle term, could itself not be used to establish inference because it is impossible to establish that all conditions required to restrict the middle term are known without recourse to inference and inference, as has been proven earlier, cannot establish itself.^[22]